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*La Fine dell'Esercito Pontificio.* Per Colonnello ATTILIO VIGEVANO.

Con 37 illustrazioni e tavole a colori e 7 carte e piani topografici.  
(Rome: Stabilimento Poligrafico per l'Amministrazione della  
Guerra. 1920. Pp. xix, 864. 100 lire.)

THIS ponderous work could not have been written before the Great War. So long as imperial, reactionary Austria threatened Italy from the summits of the Alps, the question of the restoration of the temporal power of the papacy in Rome was still open; and while this question was open, and while papal opposition continued against the participation of the faithful in the elections of modern Italy ("neither electors nor elected"), an impartial study of the organization and operations of the extinct papal army that had been created to prevent the completion of Italian unity was not to be expected.

Colonel Vigeveno has long been occupied in the study of the last years of the papal army, and has published other important military studies of the Risorgimento period in the *Memorie Storiche Militari* of the Italian General Staff, in *La Nuova Rivista di Fanteria*, and in other reviews. His studies have always evinced sound historical method, and in the present volume, dealing with events which have hitherto formed the subject only of polemics and of biased history, his critical work is so nicely balanced as to satisfy only the open-minded.

The volume contains much technical detail and many tables upon military organization, but the body of the work is of great interest also to the general historian; it is prefaced by a sketch of papal military institutions from 1849 till 1870, and concludes with a brief study of the subsequent adventures of the French papal zouaves in the Franco-German War. A great number of documents are given in the text, many of them previously published in Cadorna's *La Liberazione di Roma*, in Bonetti's *La Liberazione di Roma*, and in de Beaufort's *Histoire de l'Invasion des États Pontificaux*, but many are here published for the first time from the Regio Archivio di Stato di Roma, Ministero, Armi Pontificie, and other archives; unfortunately the other archives are not indicated, and bibliographical references after the first chapters leave much to be desired.

The document which offers the most important historical contribution is the original text of the famous letter (until now only known in an altered version) addressed by Pope Pius IX. to his commander-in-chief and acting war minister, General Hermann Kanzler, on September 19, 1870. In an audience of September 10, upon which Vigeveno gives entirely new information, the pope had informed his general that he must offer only such resistance to the Italian army in its operations for the occupation of Rome, as should be necessary to prove to the world that the papacy was a victim of aggression. "We ask you to surrender, not to die; that is to say, we ask of you the greater sacrifice." The pope's letter upon the same subject, as now published by Vigeveno, di-

rects: "That negotiations for surrender shall be opened as soon as the cannon shall have opened fire . . . ; never let it be said that the Vicar of Christ, however unjustly assailed, has given his consent to any shedding of blood."

The order to cede thus without offering a resistance was altogether distasteful to General Kanzler, a German soldier who cared more for his military reputation than for the saving of Italian blood. He therefore chose to disobey his sovereign, neglecting to issue the orders required; he allowed resistance to be protracted for more than four hours after the cannon opened fire, and raised the white flag only when a breach had been made in the city walls and nearly three hundred men had been killed or wounded. The pope was greatly grieved at the prolonged fighting, believing at the moment that it was due to unwillingness on the part of the Italians to desist from firing, and learning only later that it was due to failure on the part of his own commander to carry out sovereign orders. A few hours later Kanzler had a private audience with His Holiness. What transpired at it has remained a complete secret to this day. But when, on September 21, the pope's letter of the 19th was given to the *Civiltà Cattolica* for publication, two phrases in it were altered so as to cover the general's disobedience; the pope was made to order "that negotiations for surrender shall be opened as soon as a breach shall have been made", instead of, *as soon as the cannon shall have opened fire*; and the words "great shedding of blood" were substituted for, *shedding of blood*. To avoid an exhibition of insubordination in the last hour of the temporal power, Pius IX. thus preferred to assume before the world a responsibility for bloodshed that was not his; and all historians, both clerical and Italian, have until now quoted the substituted text of the papal letter of September 19, which indicated this responsibility.

From documents given it is clear that both Pius IX., and at the last Kanzler also, were convinced that the Italian troops would not actually attack Rome; on the morning of September 19, the latter said to His Holiness, "The King of Sardinia will never risk the using of violence against the representative of God in his own residence." And it is equally evident that the Italians did everything possible to enter Rome without bloodshed.

Vigevano may be criticized as being too severe in his condemnation of the papal colonel Serra for having surrendered Civitavecchia, on September 16, without offering resistance to the Italian fleet and army. Serra was an Italian, however, and in avoiding bloodshed at Civitavecchia and the damaging of the city, he did only what the pope wished to have done at Rome. Nor has Vigevano succeeded in always avoiding errors of fact, as when he states the surprise of Kanzler at finding in the conditions for surrender offered by Cadorna that the pope was to be left in full possession of the Leonine City with Castel S. Angelo.

The truth was that, so long before as August 29, the Italian government had promised this in a memorandum sent to the various powers of Europe, and this promise must have been known in Rome.

The writer, while free in his criticisms, treats the papal army always with respect, and his words in summarizing the papal operations of September 1870 are: "Pallida fine d'un buon esercito."

H. NELSON GAY.

*The Memoirs of Count Witte.* Translated from the Original Russian Manuscript and edited by ABRAHAM YARMOLINSKY. (Garden City, N. Y., and Toronto: Doubleday, Page, and Company. 1921. Pp. xi, 445. \$5.00.)

THIS is a notable and highly interesting book, written we are told while the author was abroad, where he could keep his manuscript from the curiosity of the too inquisitive police of his own country. He has given us not so much a systematic biography as a running commentary on events with which he was connected and people with whom he was brought into contact. It is the story of a strong, rough man who fought his way to greatness and played a leading part on the European stage during the last years of the nineteenth century and the first of the present one. Throughout these years Witte stands forth as unquestionably the foremost man in Russia, head and shoulders above those about him, most of whom hated him and whom he in turn despised. We can see him as he was, direct, incisive, contemptuous of all who disagreed with him—and most people did—and we can admire his enterprise, his tireless energy, his sane judgment, and his astonishing fertility of resource. As for his judgment of men and things, though he was an avowed conservative, his criticisms of the old régime are severe enough to satisfy any radical, and his remarks about the people he dealt with are nothing if not pungent.

On the other hand we do not get a pleasant idea of his own personality. His book is one long paean on his faultless achievements, for which others get little credit. For instance, he ascribes entirely to his efforts the concession by China to Russia of the prolongation of the trans-Siberian railway line through Manchuria. One would never imagine from his words that the arrangement had already been discussed, and was supposed to have been practically agreed to, before Li Hung Chang came to St. Petersburg, and that it is still generally known as the Cassini Convention. Witte never mentions the name of Cassini; if he had done so it would probably have been in disparagement. The one man that he speaks of in terms of admiration and reverence is Tsar Alexander III. For Nicholas II. he can have had little but contempt, which, however, is decently expressed; in fact he probably disliked the tsar less than the tsar disliked him. His last chapter, *My Impressions of the Kaiser*, makes good reading and though hostile is not grossly un-